Distinction Between the Taliban and Al Qaeda

In distinguishing the Taliban from Al Qaeda, the Taliban is provincial and localized while al Qaeda is a global movement. In a historical context, the Taliban regime ruled Afghanistan until 2001, while Al Qaeda carried out the attacks of September 11, 2001. Barnett Rubin, a leading expert on Afghanistan and Director of Studies at the Center on International Cooperation at NYU, gives an analysis as to the distinction between the two groups. He says that those who are unfamiliar with the region often confuse the two groups, to the point where a US congressman expressed surprise at the fact that the Taliban did not carry out 9/11 attacks. As for the group membership, Al Qaeda is composed of mostly Arabs and Islamic militants from countries other than Afghanistan. Al Qaeda has a global agenda that goes beyond any specific country and is aimed at a global jihad against America as a superpower. In essence, al Qaeda’s mission a kind of anti-imperialist movement with Islam at its core. In comparison, much of the Taliban leadership is formed of ethnic Pashtuns, dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan, who grew up in Pakistani madrassas, or fundamentalist religious schools, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980’s. The Taliban outlook has always been focused on Afghanistan as opposed to the global mindset of Al Qaeda. In fact, Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, had never actually been to Kabul until it was seized by the Taliban in 1996. He has never stayed overnight in the capital city. These facts serve mostly to demonstrate the Taliban’s scarce economic resources in comparison with those of Al Qaeda. In fact, Osama bin Laden, heart of Al Qaeda, grew up in tremendous wealth, speaks several languages, and traveled the world (including the West). Moreover, his bombers for 9/11 lived in Europe and were educated in elite universities. Therefore, Al Qaeda is a highly specialized group of Islamists drawn from around the world. Some Al Qaeda members operated against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in 1980, but all have a tie to Saudi Wahabbi Islam, which is a radical faction of Sunni Islam.

Furthermore, many believe that the Taliban was initially fostered by Pakistan’s ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency as the equivalent of the CIA, in an attempt to influence relations with Afghanistan. During the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan, young Taliban fighters were mostly educated in the provinces of Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan; these men were then “installed” in Kabul with the help of Pakistan’s ISI. After 9/11, Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf announced that Pakistan was severing all ties with the Taliban in order to join the US in a war against terror. However, Pakistan cracked down mainly on Al Qaeda operatives while letting Taliban members seep across the border. Rubin concludes the label "Taliban" is now being used in a political way by people who are trying to monopolize power in Afghanistan by excluding large portions of the Pashtun population. He says the only people who should be excluded from politics in Afghanistan are those who have committed war crimes or continue to fight against the new internationally backed constitutional order.

In terms of foreign relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Durand Line refers to the demarcated border between Afghanistan and Pakistan that Afghanistan refuses to recognize because some ethnically Pashtun states lie south of the border in Pakistan.

The plan to deal with the Taliban would be to reintegrate the Taliban into Afghanistan as a political party. The structure of the Taliban is disintegrating, as young Taliban warriors are becoming disillusioned with the movement while their leaders are secure in hideouts in Pakistan. The leaders are not leading by example while the young Taliban fighters feel the futility of a constant uphill battle in the war against America. Furthermore, as the US cracks down on capturing more Taliban leaders, the Taliban’s support and power will further weaken. Moreover, the Taliban would have to respect and adhere to the Afghan constitution to legitimize their right as a political force. The Taliban would participate in democratic elections, though support in numbers in Afghanistan for the Taliban has diminished through the years of war against America. To maintain fair and equitable election standards, UN representatives would be stationed in Afghanistan during election time, as they were during Iraq’s elections. Furthermore, only Taliban members who have not committed war crimes would be able to participate in government, while Taliban war criminals will be tried in the International Court of Justice. In terms of the Taliban’s perspective, the Taliban would want to be integrated into Afghan political society as the Taliban still desires power in Afghanistan. The Taliban realizes that militarily they cannot beat America, and so the only avenue for power would be through government. If the Taliban wins a fair election, America should still be satisfied with the outcome as Afghanistan’s right to self- determination, or Afghanistan’s right to choose its own type of government. If the Taliban does not desire the suggestion of making the group a political party, they will lose all power in Afghanistan. Pakistan will not be able to fund the group (as our next conclusion will suggest) and public support for the Taliban is already lacking.